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NOTES
THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE IN TITLE VII
CIVIL SUITS
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased use of the class action device in title VIII civil
suits reflects the burgeoning belief that no more efficient way
exists to eradicate wide-spread discriminatory employment prac-
tices. Unfortunately, title VII class action litigants and the courts
have often proceeded with an unawareness of the manner in
which the interaction of title VII with rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure2 can alter the normal course of a title VII suit.
This note seeks to provide a general survey of some of the more
common procedural problems which arise in title VII class ac-
tions. However, before that task may be undertaken, it is first
necessary to discern the substantive policies underlying the use
of class actions in title VII litigation. This can best be achieved
by tracing the evolution of title VII enforcement procedures up
to their inclusion of the class action device.
II. THE EvoLUTION OF CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES IN THE
STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT SCHEME
The enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
represented a strong congressional policy to eliminate specific
types of discriminatory employment practices which had long
plagued employees in the private sector.4 With the amendment
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. This rule sets forth the prerequisites a plaintiff must establish
to the court's satisfaction before he will be allowed to conduct his action as a class action.
In addition, the rule sets forth the types of class actions which may be maintained and
the criteria which a court is to apply in determining which type of class action, if any, is
before it. Other provisions deal with the conduct of the action, the powers of the court to
certify that a class action is appropriate, the powers of the court to direct the course of
the action, and the effect that a class action judgment will have on the class members.
3. 78 Stat. 253-66 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 &
Supp. II 1972)).
4. The report of the House of Representatives which accompanied the Civil Rights
Act contained a brief statement of the purpose behind title VII: "The purpose of this title
is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, dis-
639
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of that title in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,5
the coverage of title VII was completed by Congress' setting forth
specific proscriptions against discriminatory employment prac-
tices by state and local governments5.' and by the federal govern-
ment.6 In addition, those amendments sought to remove certain
crimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin." H. R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391,
2401.
This same legislative history noted, however, that the degree of success which the
Civil Rights Act might obtain in its mammoth undertaking to eliminate much of the
discrimination plaguing American society in 1964 would be limited to some extent. Never-
theless, the House Report noted that the legislative effort was necessary and not entirely
without merit:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and conse-
quences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is
reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment
of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create
an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of dis-
crimination.
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation
which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types
of discrimination. This [the bill] would achieve in a number of related areas.
.. .H.R. 7152, as amended, is a constitutional and desirable means of dealing
with the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination. It is a
reasonable and responsible bill whose provisions are designed effectively to meet
an urgent and most serious national problem.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2391, 2393-94.
Similarly, it has been noted that antidiscrimination legislation in the employment
opportunity context is also limited in the role it can play in uplifting disadvantaged
minorities to an improved socio-economic status. See Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal
Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 417, 418 (1966). The general
consensus of the commentators, however, has been that any effort to eliminate the impact
of discrimination on the socio-economic status of the historically disadvantaged would
have been incomplete if no attention had been given to the need for equal employment
opportunity. As cogently explained by one commentator:
In constructing the hierarchy of important matters in the Great Society,
equal employment is not only near the top, but many will urge nothing is more
important. It will be of little avail to a Negro to have the right to enter a
restaurant if he cannot afford to pay for the meal; and the right to stay at a fine
hotel or sit in a theatre are [sic] of no importance to a man without money.
...While not deprecating the importance of education, nevertheless, unless
that education helps the underprivileged achieve a better economic position,
there is almost a cruel quality in giving an education which spreads false
dreams.
Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 473, 473
(1966).
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103-13 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. H 1972)).
5.1. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 701(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)
(Supp. II 1972).
6. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 717, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(Supp. H 1972). This provision was, primarily a reaction to what Congress perceived to be
an unsatisfactory record by the federal government in resolving its equal employment
2
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deficiencies which had become apparent in the procedures for
enforcing the title.'
Under the original provisions which set forth the means of
enforcing title VII's proscriptions against employment discrimi-
nation, it was contemplated that the emphasis would be on
"private settlement and the elimination of unfair practices with-
out litigation."' 8 Congress sought to implement this purpose by
establishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission9
(hereinafter EEOC) and by empowering it to conduct investiga-
tions and seek conciliation pursuant to a charge filed with it by
an aggrieved party."° While this process was not without features
which rendered it attractive to the parties concerned, weaknesses
opportunity problems. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2158. The root causes of this
unsatisfactory record were determined to be the lack of a uniform enforcement process
and, more specifically, the existing difficulties in obtaining an impartial forum in federal
district court due to the oft asserted defense of sovereign immunity. These were the
shortcomings which Congress sought to correct. See id., reprinted in [1972] U.S.C. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2158; Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 824, 853-57 (1972).
7. For a discussion of the specific changes proposed and eventually adopted, see Sape
& Hart, note 6 supra. Congress apparently was concerned that gaps in the enforcement
mechanisms of title VII as originally enacted had rendered the title less than effective.
Exemplary of this dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the original act were statements
contained in the House Education and Labor Committee report which accompanied the
House version of the 1972 amendments [H.R. 1746]:
Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment op-
portunity for all our citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is not adequate.
Despite the progress which has been made since passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, discrimination against minorities and women continues. The pers-
istence of discrimination, and its detrimental effects require a reaffirmation of
our national policy of equal opportunity in employment.
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2139.
8. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968). Similarly, it
was noted in Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1968) that title VII's
emphasis was on "voluntary conference, persuasion, and conciliation as the principal tools
of enforcement."
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp.
II 1972)).
10. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964), as
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b) (Supp. II 1972). Under that section, the EEOC was
required to notify the charged party upon its receipt of a properly executed charge. The
Commission would conduct an investigation pursuant to that charge and make a finding
of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause to believe the charge was true. If it determined
that reasonable cause existed to believe the charge, the Commission would then "endeavor
to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation and persuasion." Id.
3
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inherent in its voluntary nature proved it to be inadequate to
ensure equal employment opportunity." Congress apparently had
anticipated this to some extent since it included a provision in the
original title for private suits in federal district court in those
instances where conciliation proved fruitless.'2 The availability of
a civil suit in federal district court was contingent, however, upon
the complainant's exhausting the conciliation processes. This
meant that a complainant must have filed a charge with the
EEOC and the Commission must have been unable, despite con-
ciliation, to obtain satisfactory results from the charged party. 3
Once the charge was filed and conciliation was not forthcoming
or the charge was dismissed by the EEOC, the aggrieved party
was entitled, upon receiving notice of his right to sue from the
Commission, to file a civil action within the statutory time
limit.4
11. For a detailed analysis of the EEOC's inability to obtain conciliation under the
original title, see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. Rav. 1109, 1200 & n.39 (1971)[hereinafter cited
as Developments].
12. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964), as
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II 1972). This was not the only civil action
authorized by title VII's original provisons, nor was the aggrieved party the only party
allowed to conduct such an action. Under § 706(e), the Attorney General was permitted
to intervene in an aggrieved party's civil action upon certifying that the action was one of
general public importance. In addition, § 707(a) of the 1964 Act authorized the Attorney
General to file a suit in federal district court when he had reasonable cause to believe that
a person or persons were engaging in a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory conduct in
violation of the title. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6 (Supp. 1 1972).
13. See Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967) (affirming
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant in case where plaintiff sought to
file his civil suit without first exhausting EEOC procedures). The nature of these jurisdic-
tional prerequisites has been the subject of much litigation. While a detailed discussion
of those cases is beyond the scope of this note, the following quotation from a leading work
in this field is illuminating as to the purpose of these requirements and their treatment
by the courts:
The various jurisdictional prerequisites to suit are designed to allow the
EEOC to perform its conciliatory function. Although conciliation inevitably
delays prompt judicial vindication of Title VII rights, Congress apparently de-
cided that the objectives of the Act could best be served by giving the informal
measures of conciliation and persuasion a chance to work. But since at least
some of the jurisdictional requirements formulated in deference to conciliation
are not unambiguously declared in the Act, courts are often free to determine
for themselves whether conciliation is really serving the ends intended for it, and
thus to give the conciliation policy as much force as experience warrants.
Developments 1199-1200.
14. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. R 1972)).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss5/4
CLASS ACTION DEVICE
The procedures set forth above in elementary form were basi-
cally retained by the 1972 amendments, although with certain
significant alterations.' 5 Most important, Congress provided the
EEOC with the power to sue in federal district court if the Com-
mission had determined with regard to a charge before it that
reasonable cause existed to believe a violation had occurred and
it had unsuccessfully sought conciliation from the charged
party.'8 This extension of the power to sue to the EEOC was
occasioned by Congress' realization that the reliance on civil suits
by private individuals to augment the conciliation process was
misplaced since most discriminatees "are largely unable or un-
willing to effectively prosecute their claims, in the absence of a
strong helper." 7 In addition, by allowing the EEOC to sue a
charged party once conciliation had failed, Congress sought to
provide the EEOC with the muscle which the Commission for-
merly lacked under the 1964 Act.'" Conciliation was thereby made
a much more attractive alternative to a charged party inasmuch
as it was now apparent that obstinancy in the conciliation process
would lead only to the rigors of defending a civil suit brought
either by the EEOC or by the aggrieved individual in federal
district court.
By the language of the title, these rather complex enforce-
ment procedures seemed to focus on remedying only that discrim-
ination which had been practiced against the aggrieved individu-
als invoking the processes.'9 In this regard,the processes appeared
15. Most of the changes made concerned parties able to sue in federal district court
and the extension of various statutory time limits. The exact changes made by the 1972
amendments are detailed in the Conference Reports presented to both houses of Congress.
See 118 CONG. REc. 7166-69 & 7563-67 (1972). See also Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsi-
dered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824
(1972), in which the authors detail the history of the 1972 amendments and explain the
changes rendered by the amendments' enactment.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972). The EEOC was also given the
authority to intervene in cases of "general public importance," a power which had for-
merly resided in the Attorney General. See id. The amendments further made provision
for the transfer of the Attorney General's authority to bring suit in "pattern or practice"
situations to EEOC, effective two years from the date of enactment. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6(c) (Supp. II 1972).
17. G. GINSBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 258 (3d ed. 1976).
18. Id.
19. A prime example can be found in the private civil action provided for under both
the original version and amended versions of the title. See title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp.
II 1972)). Such a suit is made available only to the person or persons aggrieved who filed
a charge with the EEOC or on whose behalf the EEOC filed a charge.
1977]
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to be misdirected. Rarely would a charge brought or a complaint
filed focus only on an alleged individual incident. On the con-
trary, the allegations brought were, by and large, directed at a
general policy of discrimination, of which the complainant's situ-
ation was but a single manifestation." This was to be expected,
given the nature of that discrimination which title VII proscribes.
Title VII's prohibitions are not concerned with discriminatory
treatment based on characteristics peculiar to individuals.
Rather, those prohibitions are directed against discriminatory
treatmeht based on characteristics such as race, sex, national
origin and religion which are found in classes of people. The
courts and the EEOC recognized this, and title VII discrimina-
tion was described accordingly as being class discrimination by
its very nature.'
While Congress made provision under § 2000e-6 for a broader attack against discrimi-
natory employment practices through pattern or practice suits brought by the Attorney
General and later by the EEOC, that procedure proved somewhat less than successful in
extending the protections of the title beyond a limited number of individuals. The prob-
lems underlying the ineffectiveness of this procedure have been summarized as follows:
The reluctance of the Justice Department to commence pattern or practice
suits and its failure to seek affirmative relief in those which were brought in the
years following passage of the 1964 Act precluded the effective utilization of that
procedure to productive affirmative relief to large numbers of discriminatees.
Comment, Back Pay in Class Actions and Pattern or Practice Suits Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 EMORY L.J. 163, 166 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1123 (5th Cir.
1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 31 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. E.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Developments 1218-19;
Comment, Employment Opportunity: Class Membership for Title VII Action not Re-
stricted to Parties Previously Filing Charges with EEOC, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1000, 1003;
Comment, Back Pay in Class Actions and Pattern or Practice Suits Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 EMoRY L.J. 163, 166 (1974).
The discussion of the Hall court with regard to the nature of race discrimination has
often been cited by courts and authorities dealing with this point. It is worth relating again
here:
Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it ap-
plies throughout the class. This does not mean, however, that the effects of the
discrimination will always be felt equally by all the members of the racial class.
For example, if an employer's racially discriminatory preferences are merely one
of several factors which enter into employment decision, the unlawful prefer-
ences may or may not be controlling in regard to the hiring or promotion of a
particular member of the racial class. But although the actual effects of a dis-
criminatory policy may thus vary throughout the class, the existence of the
discriminatory policy threatens the entire class. And whether the Damoclean
threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class is a question
of fact common to all the members of the class.
251 F. Supp. at 186. This same analysis is applicable also to the other forms of discrimina-
tion which title VII prohibits.
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Since the orientation of the title's prohibitions was obviously
against class discrimination, those charged with enforcing the
title were required to disregard any literal reading of the statute
and to take, instead, a perspective which looked beyond individ-
ual manifestations of discrimination. 2  Thus, their remedial ef-
forts were focused on eliminating general policies of class discrim-
ination which were the real causes of an aggrieved person's or
persons' injuries. One need only look to the practices of the EEOC
in investigating charges of discrimination, 23 or to the concomitant
tendency of the EEOC to expand charges beyond their original
scope to encompass the charged party's conduct toward a class,
24
to find examples of the broad remedial perspective taken by the
EEOC in enforcing the title.
In a manner consistent with the EEOC's efforts, the courts
made available means by which the statutorily authorized civil
suit could be broadened to effectuate in the best possible way the
policies of the title. Recognizing that private civil suits under title
VII were inherently affected with the public interest in eliminat-
ing employment discrimination and that a private litigant in such
suits by necessity represented interest beyond his own, given the
class-wide nature of title VII discrimination, the courts engrafted
the class action device onto the enforcement provisions of title
22. The court in Hall recognized the problem as follows:
[There is a] dichotomy in the philosophy underlying the enforcement pro-
visions of Title VII: emphasis is placed primarily on protection of persons sub-
ject to discrimination rather than on protection of the public interest, but for
the protection of persons subject to discrimination, Congress apparently envi-
sioned a rather broad scope of relief similar to that which would be necessary
for the protection of the public interest.
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
23. The investigations of the EEOC are generally limited only by the admonition that
the EEOC not engage in "fishing expeditions." This can be interpreted as meaning that
the evidence which the EEOC seeks in an investigation must at least be related to some
charge before it, or in other words, that the evidence be of a nature that will assist the
EEOC in conducting its investigation. See Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1342-
43 (7th Cir. 1973).
24. This expansion of charges by the EEOC should be read as flowing from the
Commission's authority to investigate those matters reasonably related to the specific
allegations raised in the charge. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
However, a more specific justification may be seen in the following:
[The] expansion of charges is not attributable to any Commission policy
of avoiding narrow complaints as such. The idea, as the Commission views it,
is to deal with the "underlying causes" of alleged discrimination rather than to
confine itself to resolution of the one particular complaint.
Gardner, The Development of the Meaning of Title WI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23
ALA. L. REv. 451, 472 (1971).
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VII. 26 Under this procedure, an aggrieved party who had ex-
hausted his remedies before the EEOC could timely file a civil
action seeking relief on behalf of himself and all others "similarly
situated." 6
With the enactment of the 1972 amendments to title VII, 27
the availability of the class action device to title VII litigants
became firmly established. Although no specific statutory treat-
ment was accorded to class actions,2" the legislative history con-
tains specific language expressing the intent of Congress that
courts sitting in title VII civil actions should continue to provide
liberal access to the class action device. Significant are the state-
ments by Senator Harrison Williams, a principal author of the
1972 amendments, in his section-by-section analysis of the bill as
reported from the Conference Committee and subsequently en-
acted into law:
In establishing the enforcement provisions under this
subsection and subsection 706(f) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)] gen-
erally, it is not intended that any of the provisions contained
therein shall affect the present use of class action lawsuits under
Title VII in conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The courts have been particularly cognizant of
the fact that claims under Title VII involve the vindication of a
major public interest, and that any action under the Act in-
volves considerations beyond those raised by the individual
claimant. As a consequence, the leading cases in this area to
date have recognized that many Title VII claims are necessarily
25. Developments 1218-19. As noted before, the court in Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.,
251 F. Supp. 184, 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) characterized the enforcement provisions of title
VII as containing an apparent dichotomy since the emphasis of those provisions is on
protecting aggrieved persons and the apparent intent of Congress was that relief be broad
in order to protect the public interest. See note 22 supra. In resolving this problem, the
court concluded that "[a] privately instituted class action is unique in its adaptability
to Title VIi's split personality." 251 F. Supp. at 187.
26. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). Participation in
the class action, however, is not restricted to those who have filed with the EEOC. It is
enough that one member of the class has exhausted the remedies at that level and that
the issues raised by the class action are reasonably related to those which the filing
member raised before the EEOC. Id. at 499. This applies even though the relief sought
by the class action is "make whole" in nature, such as back pay. See Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975). See also notes 86-92 and accompanying text
infra.
27. See notes 5-7 & 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
28. The House bill [H.R. 1746], as passed, contained an amendment which specifi-
cally pertained to class actions but which was eventually rejected by the Conference
Committee. See note 92 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 28
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class action complaints and that, accordingly, it is not necessary
that each individual entitled to relief be named in the original
charge or in the claim for relief.
29
This statement constituted, in effect, a congressional ratification
of the judicially developed viewpoint which had long before recog-
nized the efficacy of the class action device in title VII litigation.30
Although the propriety of the class action device has been
secured in title VII litigation, the availability of that device to a
title VII litigant is dependent on procedural requirements which
must be read in conjunction with the requirements and policies
of title VII. Thus, before a prospective class representative will
be allowed to prosecute his title VII civil action as a class action,
he must first satisfy the court not only that he has fulfilled the
jurisdictional prerequisites under title VII,31 but also that his
action is procedurally correct under rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.3 2 This is not a burden to be taken lightly since
the class representative will be usually required to demonstrate
affirmatively those facts needed to satisfy the standards of rule
23. It is not sufficient for him to make conclusory pleadings along
the guidelines of that rule.3 3 It should, therefore, be understood
that even though the predominant approach has been to read the
rule liberally in favor of allowing a complainant's action to pro-
ceed as a class action, 34 it is still necessary that the class repre-
29. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
30. It is interesting to note that the approach to class actions which Senator Williams
endorsed in his section-by-section analysis had been developed under a remedial scheme
which had placed primary responsibility for the conduct of a civil action with the individ-
ual complainant. See, e.g., Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. I1 1972)); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D.
184 (E.D. La. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).The
language of the conference report indicates, however, that the obvious intent of Congress
was that the "liberal reading of class actions . . . [should] be continued, even though
the litigation [might] be conducted by the government [EEOC] rather than individual
plaintiffs." Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 877 (1972).
31. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
32. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968);
Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 13 FEP Cases 133 (M.D.N.C. 1974); 2 A. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 49.52, at 10-84 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LARSON];
Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J. 275, 278 (1972).
33. See Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 13 FEP Cases 133, 134 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
34. Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Terminal Transp. Co., 13 FEP Cases 1284, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
1977]
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sentative carefully present his case in order to avoid difficulties."
The remainder of this note will discuss some of the more common
issues which arise in title VII class actions.
II. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND THE SCOPE OF THE ACTION
WHICH HE MAY BRING
It has been suggested previously in this note that the class
action device was judicially engrafted onto the enforcement pro-
visions of title VII as a means of enhancing the efficiency of title
VII civil actions in eliminating general policies of discrimina-
tion." Questions remained, however, concerning who was quali-
fied to bring such an action and what scope the action brought
should be permitted to take. By and large, the courts have shown
great liberality in resolving these questions, and this tendency
has, in turn, affected the manner in which the requirements of
rule 23 have been applied to title VII class actions.
37
A. The Class Representative
Upon filing a proper civil action contesting discriminatory
employment practices, the title VII complainant is usually ac-
corded a special status by the courts." To the extent that the title
VII plaintiff is important to the enforcement of the title, the
complainant's status is further enhanced when he files his title
35. See 2 LARSON § 49.51, at 10-80:
[Nlo question or issue is as simple as it may seem in isolation, for in Title VII
class actions, as nowhere else, the requirements of Rule 23 and Title VII interact
to create a flexible but sensitive judicial apparatus wherein any one statement
of an issue, determination of class size or composition, or fulfillment of a neces-
sary prerequisite may depend upon or in turn affect a second factor.
36. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
37. See 2 LARSON §§ 49.51-.52 (1976).
38. Complainants filing civil suits under title VII frequently have been referred to as
"private attorneys general." See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th
Cir. 1968). That characterizaton has general applicability to all plaintiffs suing under
antidiscrimination legislation. Its origin may be traced to the following discussion by the
Supreme Court concerning the nature of suits brought under title H of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforce-
ment would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon
private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. A Title
II suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that
Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not
for himself alone, but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1967) (citations omitted).
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VII suit in the form of a class action. This does not mean, how-
ever, that an employee with frivolous or nonexistent claims may
champion the cause of his peers by filing a class action. Rather,
an employee bringing a title VII class action, as any other person
filing suit in federal district court, must establish his right to be
there.
1. Plaintiff's standing to represent the class. - The named
plaintiff's standing to represent the class hinges on two require-
ments. First, the class representative must establish that he has
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisites to a civil suit by showing
that he filed a proper charge and exhausted his administrative
remedies. 9 This requirement applies even though the courts have
held generally that participation in a title VII class action is not
restricted to those who have filed with the EEOC.0 Should the
named plaintiff fail to fulfill this requirement, sufficient grounds
will exist for the court to dismiss the class action since the court
will be without jurisdiction over the class representative.4 '
Second, the class representative must be able to demonstrate
his standing to invoke the federal judicial power. To do this, the
representative's individual claims must present a case or contro-
versy within the meaning of article II, section 2 of the United
States Constitution.'" The class representative's "minimal re-
quirement .. . is that he or she must [have been] personally
aggrieved by the discrimination."4 This requirement remains a
39. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
40. See note 26 supra.
41. Cf. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 10 FEP Cases 844, 850-51 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (plaintiff
who failed to comply with jurisdictional requirements of Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970), had no standing to sue on her own behalf and
therefore was precluded from maintaining an action on behalf of a class of persons with
like claims under the Act). See generally note 13 and accompanying text supra. Similarly,
where the class includes persons who would have been unable to file on their own behalf
because of the running of the statutory time limit as to their claims, the class will be
restricted to those members capable of filing at the time the action was brought. Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424
U.S. 737 (1976); Muller v. Curtis Publishing Co., 57 F.R.D. 532, 535-36 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Hecht v. Cooperative for Am. Relief Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). This latter situation, however, should be distinguished from those instances in
which members of the class (other than the class representative) have not exhausted the
available administrative remedies but are not yet precluded from proceeding against the
employer by the statutory time limit. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d at
246.
41.1. U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 2; see, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-
57 (1911).
42. 2 LARSON § 49.51, at 10-81. For a thorough discussion of how standing require-
ments are to be applied to title VII class action plaintiffs, see Senter v. General Motors
Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 516-20 (6th Cir. 1976).
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very real one even though the courts have generally applied the
requirement in an undemanding fashion. 3 Where the class repre-
sentative is unable to show that he is "a person claiming to be
aggrieved"" within the meaning of the title, he will not be allowed
to represent the class and the class action will be dismissed,45
regardless of any liberal tendency to view the requirement as
satisfied.
2. The continuation of the class action when the class repre-
sentative's individual claim is mooted or dismissed before trial.
- Once the class representative has established that, at the time
of his instituting the action, he is a person claiming to be ag-
grieved, he may proceed to conduct his suit as a class action,
provided the case has been certified as appropriate for class ac-
tion treatment by the court pursuant to rule 23(c)(1)." Difficult
problems arise, however, where the class representative's justifia-
ble individual claims are mooted or dismissed at any time before
a determination on the merits." Those problems may be capsul-
ized under two basic points of inquiry that a court confronted
with such a situation must resolve. First, the court must decide
whether or not the class aspects of the plaintiff's suit should be
allowed to continue. Second, if the court does decide to allow the
class aspects of the case to continue, the court must then decide
whether or not the original class representative should be allowed
to continue in his representative capacity."
43. The liberal tendency of the courts in seeing this requirement as met by title VII
plaintiffs is demonstrated by the following analysis contained in a Third Circuit opinion:
The national public policy reflected . . . in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. . .may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial
doctrines of standing or election of remedies. If the plaintiff is sufficiently ag-
grieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or
controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue in his
own right and as a class representative.
Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 443, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971). It seems apparent
from the Hackett court's analysis that much of this liberal attitude is grounded in judicial
deference to the strong public interest in eliminating employment discrimination which
underlies title VII.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
45. Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 8 FEP Cases 353 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Comment,
Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class
Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 599 [hereinafter cited as 1974 DtK Comment].
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides as follows: "As soon as practicable after the
commencement of the action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained."
47. This encompasses the mooting or dismissing of a justiciable claim on either fac-
tual or legal grounds. 1974 DUKE Comment 579.
48. Id. at 575. These questions
650 [Vol. 28
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An assessment of the propriety of allowing the class aspects
of the representative's action to continue is integrally related to
a determination of the point in the proceedings when the class
aspects of the action have attained an independent existence
apart from the representative's personal claims." The most ob-
vious approach is to view such an existence as attained once the
class action is certified by the court under rule 23(c)(1) and at no
other point in time." There are, however, situations where a rigid
application of this general rule of thumb for determining the
propriety of class continuation would be inappropriate. These
instances arise whenever the policies favoring class actions under
title VII dictate that the class aspects of the action be allowed to
continue.
The first such instance exists whenever dismissal of the class
aspects of the action would be likely to result in the claims of the
class never being adjudicated.51 Such a situation would exist, for
usually [arise] when only one named plaintiff is involved. If other representa-
tive plaintiffs remain before the court, then, regardless of the dismissal of one
of them, the ability of the remaining representatives to continue representing
the class action is unimpaired.
Id. at 575 n.8.
49. Id. at 582-83; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1976)
(although the sole named representative's claim was dismissed, an independent adversary
relationship existed between the class and the defendant sufficient to sustain the suit as
a live controversy).
50. This reliance solely on the granting of a motion to certify as the point at which
the class aspects of a case acquire an independent existence has been defended as follows:
Both the assertion that the plaintiffs' rights to a 23(c)(1) determination are
unconditional and the related view that an action in favor of the class may,
merely on the basis of the pleadings, be presumed to exist prior to the certifica-
tion of that action are deficient. . . . [Flor the court to continue the proceed-
ing on behalf of an unrecognized class of plaintiffs beyond the named plaintiff's
loss of his individual cause of action usually would violate the case or contro-
versy requirement of article I of the Constitution. During the period between
filing and certification, a class action is supported solely by the pleadings, which
may or may not have a foundation in fact compatible with the requirements of
rule 23(a) and (b). Since this class has not yet been found to exist by the court,
it is merely thought or assumed to exist hypothetically for the limited purpose
of enabling the plaintiff to prove its actual existence. If, subsequent to filing the
action, the plaintiff's cause of action is lost, there is no longer any actual party
before the court with a claim against the defendant. The representative no
longer has a claim, and the class, since it has not yet been actually recognized,
cannot yet support an action before the court . . . . Accordingly, if a class
representative loses his personal cause of action prior to the entry of a court
order for certification, the court would appear to be barred . . . from further
entertaining the class action.
1974 DUKE Comment 596-97.
51. Id. at 599-600.
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example, when a defendant attempts to avoid class litigation by
giving the individual representative everything he wants, thereby
mooting the representative's personal cause of action. Since it is
clear that the defendant could continually avoid class litigation
in this manner, the courts usually balance the equities against a
strict application of the case or controversy requirement and
allow the class aspects of the case to continue.52 The importance
of this exception is obvious in the title VII context.-3
The second instance in which an exception to the general rule
is warranted arises when the absence of certification is due to the
court's failure to heed its mandate under rule 23(c)(1).14 The fed-
eral rules require that certification issue "as soon as practicable
after the commencement of [the] action. ' 5 This mandate does
not contemplate inquiries into the merits of either the class repre-
sentative's individual claims or the claims raised on behalf of the
class." Thus, a court which delays certification pending extensive
hearings on the merits should not be permitted to disallow contin-
uation of the class aspects of the case when the representative's
personal claims are dismissed or mooted prior to issuance of the
certification order .
7
52. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968); 1974 DuKE
Comment 599-600.
53. In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., the Fifth Circuit characterized the situation in
the following manner:
With so much riding on the claim of the private suitor, the possibility that
in this David-Goliath confrontation economic pressures will be at work toward
acceptance of preferred post-suit jobs and the equal possibility that an employer
would devise such a resist-and-withdraw tactic as a means of continuing its
former way calls for the trial court to keep consciously aware of time-tested
principles paticularly in the area of public law. Such actions in the face of
litigation are equivocal in purpose, motive and permanence.
400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968).
54. See 1974 DUKE Comment 600-01.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
56. In a landmark decision concerning class action procedure, the Supreme Court
stated the following:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action . . . .This
procedure is directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(1) that the
court determine whether a suit denominated a class action may be maintained
as such "as soon as practicable after the commencement of [the) action ... .
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). A similar holding had been
reached previously in the context of a title VII class action. See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co.,
485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. See 1974 DUKE Comment 601. This is, in essence, a form of estoppel invoked
against the court.
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A third such instance, and the most significant one in the
context of title VII class actions, arises when the class representa-
tive's action would perforce involve the assertion of interests be-
yond his own. The dismissal or mooting of the representative's
individual claims in this situation should not affect the viability
of the class aspects of the case, whether or not certification has
occurred prior thereto." Given the courts' almost unanimous
characterization of title VII discrimination as inherently class
discrimination,59 it seems entirely proper that the independent
existence of the class should be recognized from the very begin-
ning of the action.' It has thus been held that the continuing
interests of the class members in a title VII class action will
present that concrete adverseness necessary to satisfy case or con-
troversy requirements on behalf of the class, whether or not the
representative himself is still asserting viable personal claims. 1
Once a court has determined that the class aspects of the
case may properly continue despite dismissal or mooting of the
class representative's individual claims, it must then assess
whether or not the class representative should be allowed to con-
tinue his representation on behalf of the class.2 In making this
assessment, the court should apply the criteria of rule 23(a)(4).13
Thus, before the court permits the class representative to con-
tinue in his representation of the absent class members, he should
be required to show that he has a continuing ability to represent
the class interests in a fair and adequate manner.14 Even if the
58. See id., citing Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
59. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
60. See 1974 DUKE Comment 601 n.121.
61. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1976); see Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968).
62. See 1974 DuKE Comment 592.
63. The representativity requirement contained in rule 23(a)(4) requires that a class
representative be able to protect the interests of the class in a fair and adequate manner.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). See also text accompanying notes 125-38 infra.
64. See 1974 DUKE Comment 598. This approach, however, has not been followed
uniformly. Of particular interest here is the tendency of courts confronted with this ques-
tion in a title VII class action suit to neglect to evaluate the status of the class representa-
tive as of the time his personal claims were dismissed. The general approach taken in title
VII cases has been that if the class representative satisfied the representativity require-
ment at the time the action was commenced, then the dismissal of his individual claims
will have no affect on his status as the class representative. Thus in Moss v. Lane Co.,
the Fourth Circuit stated:
If the plaintiff [class representative] were a member of the class at the com-
mencement of the action and his competency as a representative of the class
then determined or assumed, the subsequent dismissal or mootness of his indi-
1977]
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court determines that the class representative is capable of pro-
viding continued fair and adequate representation at the time his
individual claims are dismissed, the interests of the absent class
members dictate that the inquiry not cease at that point in time.
Rather, the court should undertake a constant reevaluation of the
plaintiff's representative status in order to ensure that subse-
quent events do not affect adversely the plaintiffs capacity to
supply adequate representation." Only in this manner can the
interests of the absent class members be safeguarded adequately.
B. The Scope of the Action Which a Class Representative May
Bring
Probably no more significant determination is made in a
title VII class action than the determination of the scope of the
action. No other determination has as significant a bearing on the
application of rule 23 standards to a title VII class action. Never-
theless, the courts have shown great liberality in making this
determination, often to the detriment of absent class members
and defendants alike. The following discussion presents an over-
view of the manner in which this determination of scope is usually
made.
1. The breadth of the action. - The courts have generally
circumscribed the breadth of title VII class actions only by the
requirement that the allegations contained in the class represent-
ative's complaint be reasonably related to those which he raised
before the EEOC.66 Apart from that minor limitation, the courts
vidual claim, particularly in a discrimination case, will not operate as a dis-
missal or render moot the action of the class, or destroy the plaintiff's right to
litigate the issues on behalf of the class.
471 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1973). This approach might well be explained by the characteri-
zation of a title VII plaintiff as a private attorney general, representing interests which go
beyond his own. See note 38 supra. Yet another reason for this approach may be that the
courts desire to give great leeway to those willing to prosecute title VII class actions in
order to further the national policy of eradicating widespread discrimination.
Each of these justifications, however, seems lacking. The important point to remem-
ber, and that seemingly overlooked by the courts, is that without the assurance that the
class is receiving continuing, effective representation, the possibility exists that the absent
class members will be denied their day in court. See also note 127 and accompanying text
infra.
65. 1974 DUKE Comment 602 n.122; see Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F.
Supp. 526, 533 (W.D. La. 1976) (holding that unless adequate representation is present
at every stage of the case, the court will be powerless to bind the absent class members
consistent with due process).
66. Jackson v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 882, 886 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); see Gard-
[Vol. 28
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have permitted class representatives to sue on behalf of broadly
defined classes almost as a matter of course."7 The only criterion
normally required to be met in framing the class is that the class
be defined to the extent that some point of reference exists by
which membership in the class can be tested." However, that
requirement need not be met with such specificity that each po-
tential member in the class may be ascertained in the initial
stages of the suit."
Recognizing this liberal attitude, a title VII class action
plaintiff will frequently frame his suit as an "across the board"
attack on a defendant's discriminatory employment practices."
ner, The Development of the Meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 AIA.
L. REY. 451, 519-20 (1971); Developments 1221.
67. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 353 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (defining class as "all blacks now employed or who might be employed in the future
by [the defendant-company] . . .; all blacks who were employed by the [defendant-
company] . . . [as of the effective date of title VII] but who are no longer employed
there; all blacks who unsuccessfully sought employment with the [defendant] . . . at any
time between [the effective date of title VII and the granting of the court's order] ... "
and "all blacks who are represented or who might be represented in the future by defen-
dant labor organization . . . [or] who were represented by defendant labor organization
. . . from [the effective date of title VII to the date of the court's order]. . . ."); Sanders
v. Shell Oil Co., 10 FEP Cases 941, 942 (E.D. La. 1974) (defining class as all black or
female applicants, employees and former employees of defendant from 1966 to date of
court's final order in the case); Comment, The Class Action and Title VI-An Overview,
10 U. RiCH. L. Rav. 325, 328 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Overview]. But cf. EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 310-12 (6th Cir. 1975) (limiting class to defendant's
employees because of technical mistake by the district court but stating that a broader
class would probably have been improper anyway).
68. Overview 328 n.24, see Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 10 FEP Cases 730, 740 (D.
Utah 1975) (postponing class certification until such time as plaintiff amends class action
complaint to give a more detailed description of the proper class and to outline "with
greater particularity the factual justification" for his class).
69. Overview 328 n.24. This does not mean, however, that a class action plaintiff will
be permitted to maintain a class action when he is unable to show that persons within
the defined class have suffered from the discrimination alleged. Such an inability on the
part of the plaintiff will result in a denial of class certification. See Wright v. Stone
Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1975); Thompson v. Sun Oil Co., 523 F.2d
647, 649 (8th Cir. 1975); Parker v. Kroger Co., 14 FEP Cases 75, 82 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The
basis for the requirement that the class representative be able to make this showing can
be found in the typicality requirement of rule 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); accord,
Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d at 1062.
70. The across the board class action had its genesis in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). Upon the initiation of a class action civil suit
by the plaintiffs, the defendant in Johnson moved to have the class narrowed on the
grounds that the plaintiff, as a "discharged Negro employee, could only represent other
discharged Negro employees." Id. at 1124. The district court granted the motion. On
appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed, indicating that the plaintiff's action should have been
treated as an across the board attack on a company-wide policy of discrimination. The
17
Phifer: The Class Action Device in Title VII Civil Suits
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
A complaint framed in this manner makes a broad attack on
employment policies throughout a defendant's operations. Such
a wide-ranging attack on a defendant's employment practices has
its advantages. As one commentator has noted:
The plaintiff can attack a pattern of discrimination and the
variety of forms in which it appears without the necessity of
combining with others who may be reluctant to join him, and
through the class action he can join others without the necessity
of their pursuing Title VII remedies themselves . . . . At the
very least this approach enhances the plaintiff's bargaining
power with the defendant during litigation or even prior to insti-
tuting suit by the mere threat of bringing a broad class action."
While concern for the remedial policy behind title VII has
tended to invoke from the courts a receptive attitude toward
across the board actions,7" the courts should not lose sight of the
countervailing interests dictating that a court be careful in set-
ting the dimensions of the class. A court confronted with an
across the board suit should be aware of the problems the breadth
of the class will cause for the court in its efforts to provide an
expeditious hearing of the case.73 More important, however, the
court should not lose sight of the interests of the absent class
members." Given the res judicata effect of a class action adjudi-
court was willing to admit that individual questions of fact existed with regard to different
employees. The court went on to point out, however, that the proper focus was on the
impact of the discriminatory policy upon the members of the class. When this focus was
taken, the existence of a common question of law and fact was apparent. In this context
the plaintiff was permitted to represent all present Negro employees of the defendant and
all Negro employees who had been discharged by the defendant. Id.
71. Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J. 275, 282 (1972).
72. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th
Cir. 1970).
73. This manageability problem is brought even more sharply into focus when one
considers the interstate character of many of the nation's businesses. Allowing an across
the board challenge to the employment practices of such a business could well prove
extremely burdensome upon even the most resourceful of judges.
74. The most cogent statement of this need for concern for the interests of the absent
class members in across the board actions is found in the concurring opinion to the
Johnson decision:
An over-broad framing of the class may be so unfair to the absent members as
to approach, if not amount to, deprivation of due process. Envision the hypo-
thetical attorney with a single client, filing a class action to halt all racial
discrimination in all the numerous plants and facilities of one of America's
mammoth corporations. One act, or a few acts, at one or a few places, can be
charged to be part of a practice or policy quickening an injunction against all
racial discrimination by the employer at all places. It is tidy, convenient for the
18
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cation on all those included in the class for judgment purposes,75
due process demands that care be taken to ensure that the plain-
tiff provides a fair and adequate representation of all the diverse
interests on behalf of which he purports to act.751- It is important,
therefore, that across the board class actions not be allowed by
the courts in perfunctory fashion. Rather, "the reasonable and
proper dimensions of the class should be evaluated carefully on a
case-by-case basis."7
2. The type of relief which the representative may seek on
behalf of the class. - Because of an apparent conflict between
substance and procedure, determining the various types of relief
available was long one of the most perplexing questions in title
VII class action litigation. In the formative period of such litiga-
tion, most often this question was resolved in favor of preserving
the pristine quality of the title's procedural requirements. More
courts fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and dandy for the employees if their
champion wins. But what of the catastrophic consequences if the plaintiff loses
and carries the class down with him, or proves only such limited facts that no
practice or policy can be found, leaving him afloat but sinking the class?
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold,
J., concurring).
75. The basis for this assertion can be found in FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), which
provides that
[t]he judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an
action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice [required in those actions under] subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and
who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of
the class.
The intricacies of rule 23(b)'s subdivisions will be discussed later. See notes 140-85 and
accompanying text infra. It is sufficient at this point to recognize that rule 23(c)(3)
requires a class action judgment to include all those persons determined to be members
of the class.
75.1. See Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 533 (W.D. La. 1976)
(stating that "[ilf absent parties' interests are not protected adequately, for the Court
to attempt to bind them in judgment would deprive them of their day in court.").
76. Gardner, The Development of the Meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 23 ALA. L. REv. 451, 518 (1971). One other commentator has been more specific in
his description of the certifying court's obligation:
What the court must do is make a compromise between the right of the plaintiff
to bring the class action, the right of the defendant to adequately defend the
law suit, the right of the court to manage the law suit and the right of the absent
class members to have a representative that will fairly and adequately represent
them.
Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J. 275, 285 (1972).
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recent decisions, however, were marked by a shift in focus to give
more attention to the "make whole"'76 ' character of title VII rem-
edies. The question has now been resolved by the Supreme Court
in line with this latter trend. To understand why this ultimate
resolution was reached, one must survey the various approaches
taken in the past by the courts and ascertain for what reasons
such approaches eventually were discarded.
As previously mentioned, title VII's enforcement mecha-
nisms were designed to accommodate a congressional preference
for voluntary settlements as a means of eliminating discrimina-
tion.7 Toward this end, Congress established the EEOC as a
conciliatory agency designed to conduct those processes necessary
to procure an amicable resolution of all charges of title VII dis-
crimination." The statutory scheme contemplated that the right
to a civil action would accrue to an aggrieved party only after the
conciliation processes had proved fruitless." Hence, exhaustion of
the conciliation remedy was established as a jurisdictional prere-
quisite to maintaining a civil action by the aggrieved party or by
the EEOC on his behalf.8
0
This strong policy in favor of pursuing voluntary settlements
had a marked effect on the scope of relief which might be sought
during the formative years of title VII class action litigation.
Early decisions in this area accordingly showed an obvious dis-
taste for granting any relief to those who had not properly ex-
hausted their administrative remedies. Hence, it was held at
times that the plaintiff class could not include persons who had
not filed with the EEOC.8 1
76.1. The term "make whole" refers to relief which seeks to restore particular discri-
minatees to the position they would have been in had there been no discrimination.
77. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
79. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
81. In Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., the basis for this restriction imposed on the
class was explained as follows:
[Allowing a class action to include members who have not filed with the
EEOC] would permit circumvention of the administrative remedy provided by
Title VII through the Commission in violation of § 2000e-5(e). In addition to
allowing circumvention, the recognition of the class plaintiffs seek to represent
would directly encourage aggrieved parties to avoid proceeding through the
E.E.O.C. By virtue of such a holding, aggrieved persons could escape the necess-
ity of going through administrative remedies provided by Title VII simply be-
cause they happen to be members of the same race or sex and are employed in
the same plant as an individual who has followed the procedures required by
[Vol. 28
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The courts eventually realized, however, that this analysis
was nonsensical when the class action sought only injunctive re-
lief from the defendant's discriminatory employment practices.
An injunctive action brought on behalf of a class was regarded as
involving no questions of fact apart from those allegations the
named plaintiff had raised before the EEOC. In viewing the ac-
tion in this manner, the courts generally held that inasmuch as
the defendant had already refused to conciliate on the issues
when they were raised before the EEOC by the named plaintiff,
it was impractical to think that he would now change his mind
and conciliate merely because a different person might raise the
same issues before the EEOC again. 2
The courts took a more restrictive approach, however, when
the class action sought make whole relief, such as back pay. It was
felt that claims for make whole relief would present varying fact
situations pertinent to individual entitlement" 'so that failure of
voluntary compliance with one complainant would not necessar-
ily mean that voluntary compliance would fail as to all complain-
ants.' "83 Thus, before such claims could be dealt with in a title
the law before filing suit. Obviously, this short-cut into the courts would be a
great temptation, and many fellow employees of a person who filed suit after
going through the E.E.O.C. will seek to be joined as members of his class if they
are members of the same race as the plaintiff who has exhausted his administra-
tive remedies.
271 F. Supp. 258, 265 (E.D. La. 1967), rev'd sub nom., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
82. See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 190 (E.D. La. 1968):
[When a charge of discriminatory employment practices is raised before the
EEOC], the Commission's conciliation efforts [will] undoubtedly [be] di-
rected to the overall eradication of the discriminatory employer policies. At that
time the employer [would have] the opportunity to comply with the provisions
of the Act as to the individual and as to all the issues he raised. where the
employer has refused that opportunity, [it would be safe to assume] that if all
the other individuals who might raise those same issues [were to file] com-
plaints with the Commission, the employer would still refuse to voluntarily
comply with the Act . . . .Not requiring these certainly purposeless adminis-
trative proceedings [would deprive] the employer of nothing-he cannot be
heard to say that he might have decided to bow to the persuasive powers of the
Commission if other complaints had been filed, for the opportunity to voluntar-
ily comply was not only presented once and refused, but [would remain] always
open during the pendency of the judicial proceedings.
Accord, Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
83. Comment, Back Pay in Class Actions and Pattern or Practice Suits Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 EMoRy L.J. 163, 170 (1974) (quoting Gerstle v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 218 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th
Cir. 1972) (dictum explaining reasoning of those courts not allowing back pay awards in
title VII class actions)).
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VII class action, the courts required that each class member de-
siring such relief file with the EEOC. 4
The imposition of these restrictions on the availability of
make whole relief in class actions squarely conflicted with the
substantive purpose underlying the remedial provisions of title
VII. Congress had included provisions in title VII providing make
whole relief to discriminatees as a means of restoring those per-
sons to that position in which they would have been but for the
defendant's discrimination.85 To the extent that this relief was
denied to non-filing class members, the courts apparently were
placing preeminent importance on matters of procedural integ-
rity, to the detriment of that policy which favored making whole
the victims of unlawful discrimination.
It now seems clear that this conflict finally has been resolved
in favor of respecting the substantive purpose underlying the
title's remedial provisions. This move away from the restrictive
approach discussed above was first initiated in the various courts
of appeals. With virtual unanimity, those circuit courts con-
fronted with the issue have upheld awards of back pay and other
forms of make whole relief in title VII class actions.86 Thus, in
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 7 the court stated:
We are ... unable to perceive any justification for treating
such a suit as a class action for injunctive purposes, but not
treat it so for purposes of other relief. The clear purpose of Title
VII is to bring an end to the proscribed discriminatory practices
and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion, those who have
suffered by it. To permit only injunctive relief in the class action
84. See, e.g., Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966),
discussed in Developments 1221.
85. See 118 CoNG. REC. 7168 (1972) (Senator Williams' section-by-section analysis of
the 1972 amendments to title VII):
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discre-
tion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possi-
ble. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the
scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of
unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests
not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice
complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and
effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a
position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Accord, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975).
86. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969).
87. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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would frustrate the implementation of the strong Congressional
purpose expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To require
that each employee file a charge with the EEOC and then join
in the suit would have a deleterious effect on the purpose of the
Act and impose an unnecessary hurdle to recovery for the wrong
inflicted. 8
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,89 the Supreme Court rati-
fied the mandate of the courts of appeals by indicating that back
pay (and, by implication, other forms of make whole relief) is a
proper award in title VII class action cases. The defendants in
Moody had based their objection to the award of back pay to the
plaintiff class on several grounds, one of which was that unnamed
parties in the class should not be the recipients of such an award
where they had not filed with the EEOC. The Court rejected this
contention and cited with approval, among other cases, Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co.8 0 The Court went on to note that the ap-
proach in Bowe and other circuit court opinions apparently had
been ratified by Congress upon its enactment of the 1972 amend-
ments to title VII,1 since the Conference Committee Report ac-
companying the final version of those amendments expressly had
rejected a provision in the House-passed bill which would have
limited back pay awards to those who filed a charge with the
EEOC.12 With this holding and discussion, the Supreme Court
apparently has laid the matter to rest.
C. Commentary
As indicated, the policies underlying title VII have greatly
affected the manner in which courts view title VII class actions.
88. Id. at 720.
89. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
90. Id. at 414 n.8.
91. Id.
92. See 118 CONG. REc. 7168 & 7565 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746
by the Conference Committee). The provision rejected had been contained in the substi-
tute proposal of Congressman Erlenborn. This substitute proposal, in turn, had been
incorporated into the final version of the original House bill. Had the bill been enacted in
this amended form, it would have limited drastically the scope of class actions under title
VII by restricting remedial orders in such cases to persons who either filed a charge or had
been named in a charge or amendment to a charge. See H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §
3(e) (1971) (as passed by the House). For a discussion of this bill and its rejection by the
Conference Committee, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
See also Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 875-77 (1971-72).
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Thus, the courts have recognized that once the class representa-
tive has asserted a justifiable claim on behalf of himself and the
class, the class aspects of the case will have an independent exist-
ence apart from the class representative's individual claims since
title VII discrimination is, by nature, class discrimination. Addi-
tionally, the courts have given wide latitude to title VII class
action plaintiffs to frame their suits broadly and to request a
broad spectrum of make whole relief for all class members. This
latitude has been accorded in the belief that broad class actions
promote the eradication of widespread employment discrimina-
tion and that the availability of a wide array of make whole relief
is necessary to compensate fully the discriminatees for their inju-
ries. By permitting these advantages to title VII class action
plaintiffs, the courts have provided an awesome weapon with
which to attack employment discrimination. A title VII plaintiff
who files his civil suit as a class action will be able to assure that
his suit will survive any deficiencies in his individual claims, to
amass support for his cause from others similarly situated, and,
most significantly, to dangle the threat of an enormous monetary
judgment over the head of the defendant as an inducement to
settle or conciliate.
This liberal deference given by the courts in title VII class
actions to the policies underlying title VII may result in problems,
however. An awareness that broadly framed class actions usually
are liberally allowed may induce the title VII plaintiff to bring a
very broad across the board class action in order to enhance his
bargaining power over the defendant during settlement and con-
ciliation talks. However, such actions often are framed without
any regard to whether or not the plaintiff can fairly and ade-
quately represent the class. Furthermore, such actions easily can
become unmanageable, thereby eliminating the judicial effi-
ciency which the class action device was intended to provide.
Thus, while broad class actions may be an effective means of
attacking widespread employment discrimination, the courts still
must maintain close judicial supervision over the use of such
actions to ensure that they will be judicially manageable and
procedurally fair. It is in this context that the requirements of
rule 23 have significance.
IV. THE CONDUCT OF TITLE VII CLAss AcTIONS UNDER RULE 23
The strictures of rule 23 have usually not been a stumbling
block to titleVI plaintiffs desiring to bring their civil actions on
[Vol. 28662
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behalf of a class of persons similarly situated. The liberal reading
which the courts generally have given this rule in title VII class
actions reflects not only the belief that the class action device is
an efficient method of resolving all the individual claims of dis-
crimination arising from an employer's employment practices in
one proceeding,93 but also the notion that the class action suit
constitutes the most effective means of advancing the causes of
the disadvantaged.94 In addition, this relaxed application of rule
23's requirements may be said to represent a byproduct of the
courts' tendency to allow across the board class actions by title
VII plaintiffs.95
Nevertheless, an aspiring title VII class action plaintiff
should be careful to frame his action with due regard to the spe-
cific elements of the rule. The courts are becoming increasingly
unrelenting in their demand that title VII class actions comply
with the letter of rule 23. This contraction of the courts' pre-
viously liberal attitude may be the product of a judicial realiza-
tion that class actions are susceptible to abuse in the absence of
close judicial supervision. Furthermore, this more demanding
stance in adjudging compliance with rule 23 represents an in-
creased concern for the interests of the unnamed class members
who will be bound by a court's judgment in a class action, regard-
less of the outcome. 7 An examination of the operation of rule 23's
provisions in title VII class actions follows.
A. The Requirements of Rule 23(a)
Before conducting his title VII civil action as a class action,
a prospective class action plaintiff first must establish that he is
93. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974) (Douglas,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
94. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974), Justice Douglas best
expressed this notion in his partial dissent:
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has
against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with
the view of making a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as
to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
See also Note, Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83 YALE L.J. 602, 609-10 (1973).
95. Overview 328-29.
96. See id. at 326.
97. Id.; see Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 530-41 (W.D. La.
1976) (making a very in-depth assessment of the adequacy of representation accorded the
absent class members and revoking class certification because the representation had not
been adequate in each important phase of the action).
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a proper representative98 of a proper class under rule 23(a).19 This
is not a requirement to be taken lightly, for the rule explicitly
states that a representative may sue on behalf of the class only if
the specific elements of a proper class are present. °0 These ele-
ments may be denominated as the requirements of (1) numeros-
ity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality and (4) representativity. Each
requirement will be discussed separately as each has its own pe-
culiarities and its own significance, particularly in the title VII
context.
1. Numerosity. - The initial prerequisite of rule 23(a) ne-
cessitates the prospective class action plaintiff's showing that the
class which he purports to represent is so numerous that bringing
all of its members before the court as coplaintiffs by the process
of joinder is impracticable.'"' The burden of showing the imprac-
ticability of joinder is squarely on the class representative.'0
While the representative plaintiff will not be required to prove the
exact number of the absent class members,' 3 he clearly will not
have met the requirement by making a bare allegation that nu-
merosity is present. 0 Rather, he should allege and prove that the
impact of the discriminatory employment practice or policy
which he attacks was so broad that a number of others "were
similarly affected. . and that together they define an identifia-
ble class too numerous for mere joinder."'0 5 Exactly how large a
class must be before it is considered too numerous for mere join-
der cannot be predicted with any fair amount of accuracy, how-
ever. What is or is not a sufficiently numerous class to make
98. Some of the many significant problems confronting a class action plaintiff in his
efforts to establish himself as a proper class representative have been discussed previously
in this note. See notes 38-65 and accompanying text supra.
99. FED. R. Cir. P. 23(a) states the following:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(Emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. FED. R. Cor. P. 23(a)(1).
102. Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 106 (W.D. Pa. 1974); 2 LASON § 49.52(a),
at 10-85. See generally text accompanying notes 32 & 33 supra.
103. McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 39 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
104. Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 106 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
105. 2 LAnSON § 49.52(a), at 10-85.
[Vol. 28
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joinder impracticable will almost always depend on the facts of
each particular case.' 0
2. Commonality. - More so than with any other require-
ment under rule 23(a), the requirement that there be "questions
of law or fact common to the class"1 7 is influenced by the nature
of title VII discrimination. As is particularly evident in those
cases decided under an across the board approach, most courts
have treated title VII discrimination as inherently class discrimi-
nation.0 Where a court takes this approach, any class action
attacking discriminatory employment practices will be seen as
presumptively satisfying the commonality requirement.' 9 This
presumption accrues from the fact that the action is seen as fo-
cusing on the defendant's alleged discriminatory policy that, in
its effect on the members of the class, presents common questions
of law and fact as to all members of the class.' 0 Under this analy-
106. This flexibility was noted in Moore v. Louisville Downs, Inc.:
It is well settled that "sheer quantitative measurement is not the test of imprac-
ticability; rather, the circumstances surrounding each case are determinative in
conjunction with the number [of class members] involved." . . . The decisions
reflect a practical judgment based on the particular facts of the case by consider-
ing such factors as geographical area of the group, the number in the group,
manageability of the parties, nature of the action and the relationship of the
parties to all others in the class.
6 FEP Cases 1274, 1274-75 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1973) (citations
omitted).
Probably the most important factor with regard to whether or not numerosity will be
found is the scope permitted to the plaintiff's civil suit. Thus one commentator has noted
that
where the ultimate issue and the scope of the class are broad . . . the size of
the class may be so great that numerosity is not an issue. Where the court takes
an "across the board" approach to discrimination or includes prospective em-
ployees or applicants within a class, numerosity is almost invariable [sic] as-
sured. On the other hand, where prospective employees are excluded from the
class, or the issue narrows the class to a small and easily identifiable number
or the class is limited to a specific geographical area, the courts more readily
deny class action status for lack of necessary numerosity.
2 LARSON § 49.52(a), at 10-85 to -86.
107. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(2).
108. See note 70 supra; accord, Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524
(6th Cir. 1976). See also text accompanying note 21 supra.
109. See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1975); Alaniz
v. California Processors, Inc., 13 FEP Cases 720, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Women's Comm.
for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 20-21 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 187-88 (E.D. La. 1968); Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); 2 LAsON § 49.52(b), at
10-87; note 70 supra.
110. See Smith v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 13 FEP Cases 887 (W.D. La. 1975); Waters v.
Heublin, Inc., 12 FEP Cases 617, 621 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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sis, it generally would make no difference that there may be vary-
ing individual factual circumstances present throughout the
class."'
Nevertheless, some courts have held that a merely conclu-
sory allegation of across the board discrimination will not be suffi-
cient to establish the common question of law or fact which rule
23(a) (2) requires."' In this context, the commonality requirement
necessitates an examination of "each instance of hiring, firing,
promotion and the like to determine whether or not the action
was justified before any conclusions [can] be reached as to a
general practice of the defendant.""' Under this approach, once
it is determined that a general discriminatory practice is present,
the class action will then proceed on behalf of those who were
aggrieved by that practice."' Where it is shown, however, that
"the defendant [did not act] in a generally discriminatory man-
ner, so that the issues involved [are] individual rather than class
111. See Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 523-24 (6th Cir. 1976); Rich
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1975); Women's Comm. for
Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 187-88 (E.D. La. 1968);
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). In Hicks the court
was confronted at the outset with the defendant's contention that given the plaintiff's
across the board challenge against the company's hiring practices, seniority system, pro-
motion practices, and discharge practices, different factual circumstances pertained to
each member of the class. The defendant contended that, in light of this situation, class
action treatment would be "improper because each member of the class [would] have to
present his particular problem to the Court." 49 F.R.D. at 187. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the court stated the following:
The class action is not sought in order to bring in many different factual griev-
ances; rather, it seeks to put the Court in position to render a broad remedial
order in the event that the defendant has an established discriminatory policy
or policies which operates as to all Negroes, apart from and regardless of the
individual circumstances of each. Thus, the existence and operation of a perva-
sive policy affecting all Negroes is the question of law or fact common to all
members of the class. The elimination of a discriminatory policy would not
affect the employer's right to deal with each person individually on the basis of
circumstances peculiar to that person. . . .Under this appreciation of the class
action, the objection based on the differing status of each member of the class
does not negate there being questions of law and fact common to the class.
Id. at 187-88 (emphasis in original).
112. See Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 246-47 (D. Conn. 1970);
accord, Beasley v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 406 F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Texas 1976), aff'd, 538
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1976); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 413 (D. Colo. 1971);
2 LARSON § 49.52(b), at 10-89.
113. White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 413 (D. Colo. 1971); accord, 2 LARSON
§ 49.52(b), at 10-89.
114. 2 LARSON § 49.52(b), at 10-89.
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issues," the action will not be permitted to proceed as a class
action.' 5
Given the liberal tendency of the courts to favor class ac-
tions, it is doubtful that this last-mentioned approach will be
applied in the majority of cases, because adopting such an ap-
proach would impose an onerous burden on the class representa-
tive to make extensive factual inquiries before bringing his ac-
tion. Most courts probably will choose to postpone the imposition
of this burden until a finding of liability has been made since such
facts are generally more relevant to a determination of entitle-
ment to relief."' It would thus appear, as a general rule, that
commonality is not a difficult hurdle for the title VII class action
plaintiff to overcome.
3. Typicality. - Once it has been established that a proper
class exists under rules 23(a) (1) and (a)(2), attention is shifted to
the remaining requirements under rule 23(a). Rules 23(a)(3) and
(a) (4) are designed to determine if the named plaintiff is or is not
the proper party to represent the class. In this regard, the initial
concern of the title VII class representative is to establish that his
claims for relief are typical of those asserted on behalf of the
class."' To the extent that it accepts the across the board ap-
proach in title VII class actions, a court is not likely to be overly
demanding in its assessment of whether a particular class repre-
sentative has met the typicality requirement. "Generally these
courts reason that if individual differences in the issues of fact do
not defeat the class action, neither do individual differences in
115. Id.
116. This was clearly demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit in Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974):
A Title VII class action presents a bifurcated burden of proof problem. Initially,
it is incumbent on the class to establish that an employer's employment prac-
tices have resulted in cognizable deprivations to it as a class. At that juncture
of the litigation, it is unnecessarily complicating and cumbersome to compel any
particular discriminatee to prove class coverage by showing personal monetary
loss. What is necessary to establish liability is evidence that the class of black
employees has suffered from the policies and practices of the particular em-
ployer. Assuming that the class does establish invidious treatment, the court
should then properly proceed to resolve whether a particular employee is a
member of the class, has suffered financial loss, and thus entitled to back pay
or other appropriate relief.
Id. at 443-44 (emphasis in original); accord, Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511,
524 (6th Cir. 1976); cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976) (holding
that "individually applicable evidence cannot serve as a justification for the denial of
relief to the entire class").
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
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the claims for relief.""' Nevertheless, it is still important that the
class representative be familiar with the nature of this require-
ment.
Typicality, for title VII class action purposes, has two compo-
nents: first, the class representative must have suffered similar,
although not identical, discrimination to that of the class; and,
second, the class representative must have no individual claims
antagonistic to those of the class."' With regard to the first com-
ponent, the extent to which a particular court accepts across the
board class actions will significantly affect its determination of
whether or not the class representative has suffered discrimina-
tion similar to that of the class.' 0 Thus,
[i]f the court embraces the notion that the simple fact of dis-
crimination based on a similar class characteristic creates a
viable class, typicality will rarely be an issue. But if the court
requires more particularity in the allegation by the named
plaintiff of similarity of claims and class membership, differ-
ences in the nature of the discrimination (rather than the class
characteristic on which it is based) may defeat the class ac-
tion.'2'
It is, therefore, incumbent upon a prospective class representa-
tive to familiarize himself with the approach commonly taken by
the district court in which he will file his action. Potential
problems may be avoided easily if the representative pleads
118. Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Under Title WI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J. 275, 282 (1972).
119. 2 LARSON § 49.52(c), at 10-90.
120. Id. at 10-91.
121. Id. Compare Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(holding that an allegation of across the board discrimination will satisfy typicality re-
quirement) and Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(following Mack) with Kensey v. Legg, Mason, & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 100 (D.D.C. 1973)
(holding that employer's consideration of divergent factors in deciding whether or not to
hire applicants for various positions with its firm precluded plaintiff from satisfying typi-
cality requirement when his class action purported to represent prospective applicants for
all job classifications) and Bradley v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 F.R.D. 14, 15 (S.D. Texas
1970) (holding that retired employee could not maintain a title VII class action on behalf
of past, present, and future employees because, among other reasons, there would be an
absence of typicality).
Regardless of whether or not a particular court views the typicality requirement as
satisfied by an allegation of across the board discrimination, a title VII class action
plaintiff must always provide some evidence that members of the purported class have
suffered from the discrimination alleged. The inability or failure to do so is an adequate
justification for a court to deny certification. See note 69 supra.
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sufficient facts to make clear that he has suffered discrimination
similar to that of the class.
The second component of the typicality requirement, i.e.,
that no potential antagonism should exist between the claims of
the representative and the claims of the class, is often subsumed
under the general requirement of representativity contained in
rule 23(a)(4). 122 For the purposes of establishing typicality, this
component requires only that the respective claims of the class
and of the representative not be such that an award in favor of
one would entail harm to the interests of the other.'1 Thus,
enough leeway remains such that
the claims of the class representatives [need not] be "co-
extensive with" or "identical to" those of other class members.
The requirement of typicality may be satisfied even though
varying fact patterns support the claims or defenses of individ-
ual class members or there is a disparity in the damages claimed
by the representative parties and the other members of the
class."'
Nevertheless, this second component of the typicality require-
ment may serve as a limiting factor when the class action is
inarticulately framed. A prospective class representative should
be aware that he will not be' permitted to frame his action so
broadly that it will encompass potentially antagonistic interests.
As remains to be shown, a plaintiff who frames his title VII class
action in an overbroad manner will have difficulty not only in
meeting the requirement of typicality, but also in satisfying the
requirement of representativity.
4. Representativity. - Perhaps the most significant and
certainly the most demanding requirement which confronts a
title VII class action plaintiff is the requirement of rule 23(a)(4)
that he show the ability to provide fair and adequate representa-
tion for the interests of the class.12 5 The importance of the repre-
sentativity requirement may readily be appreciated in light of the
122. 2 LARSON § 49.52(c), at 10-92; see text accompanying notes 135-36 infra.
123. See American Fin. Sys. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 109 (D. Md. 1974) (holding that
the representative party challenging a pension trust as discriminatory could not represent
those members of the class who would be disadvantaged by his proposed remedies).
124. In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 59 F.R.D. 667, 681 (W.D. Okla. 1973),
quoted in American Fin. Sys. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 108-09 (D. Md. 1974).
125. See Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 531 (W.D. La. 1976)
("The history of the action points to the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) as the most impor-
tant aspect of the class status determination.").
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fact that any judgment which issues in a class action is binding
on all members of the class.12 To have their day in court, the
absentees are dependent upon the voicing of their claims by the
class representative; thus, due process demands that the repre-
sentative be capable of asserting and defending the class mem-
bers' interests with forthrightness and vigor and with no inherent
conflicts of interest which could temper his enthusiasm."' Thus,
to avoid constant collateral attacks on a judgment disposing of a
class action, a court is apt to be more demanding in requiring the
class representative to show representativity than in having him
show any other requirement under rule 23(a). ' 1
In determining whether or not representativity is present, a
court customarily makes a threefold factual inquiry. 29 Initially,
the inquiry focuses on whether or not counsel for the representa-
tive plaintiff is experienced in the handling of class actions and
in civil rights/employment discrimination litigation."' Normally,
this inquiry may be satisfied with little difficulty since a general
showing of competency to conduct such cases will suffice more
126. See notes 74-75.1 and accompanying text supra.
127. See Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements
in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217, 1227-28 (1975). See
generally Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (holding that due process would not permit
absent class members to be bound by a state class action judgment which did not provide
fair and adequate protection for the absent class members' interests).
128. Thus in Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., it was noted that
[t]he doubt as to adequacy of representation and therefore binding effect, may
give rise to new suits on the same subject matter by absent class members
against the same defendants. The very likelihood of the new actions, even if they
are decided against the class on res judicata grounds, defeats the historical
purpose of the class action, to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Attempting to bind
absent parties without adequate representation, then, not only prejudices the
absent class members, but also fails to provide a safe harbor in which the party
adverse to the class can rest. The protection of the judgment is merely illusory.
If the Court has substantial doubt as to the adequacy of representation, it should
act pursuant to its protective responsibility to deny or revoke class certification.
422 F. Supp. at 533. Furthermore, even though the other prerequisites of rule 23(a) have
been liberally applied, the Johnson court made it clear that such was not to be the case
with the adequacy of representation requirement:
The standard [for determining representativity], however it may be artic-
ulated, must impose stringent guidelines on prospective class representatives.
. . .Thoroughness is essential to insure that absent class members receive their
full measure of due process rights.
Id. (citations omitted).
129. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II);
accord, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
130. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated
on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Overview 331.
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often than not.13' However, should it appear to the court that
counsel for the plaintiff class has a less than thorough knowledge
of class action procedure and strategy of federal practice in gen-
eral, or of the substance and procedures of title VII, denial or
revocation of class action status will result unless new, adequate
counsel is obtained.'
32
Second, the court inquires as to whether or not the opportun-
ity for collusion is present between the class representative and
the defendant. 33 This inquiry is of particular significance given
the preclusive effect of a class action judgment upon all members
of the class. In light of this effect, the court should be certain that
the suit at bar is not being brought with the defendant's encour-
agement or approval, and thus as a means of minimizing his
liability by a single action that will bar any further claims against
him.
3 4
The third and final inquiry made in determining if represen-
tativity is present focuses on whether or not the class representa-
tive represents a class containing interests inherently antagonis-
tic to his own.' 3 It is, of course, highly unlikely that the represent-
ative would pursue the antagonistic interests of other class mem-
bers with the forthrightness and vigor necessary to provide them
a fair and adequate representation. On the contrary, it is more
probable that he would be willing to sacrifice those interests not
in accord with his own. Where such antagonism can be shown, it
will usually result "in a limitation of class scope or a denial of
[the] named plaintiff's representation of the class."'
3 6
131. 2 LAoeN § 49.52(d), at 10-95.
132. See Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 541 (W.D. La. 1976);
Parker v. Kroger Co., 14 FEP.Cases 75, 83 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
133. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II);
accord, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969);
Overview 331-32.
134. The presence of this danger in title VII class actions was astutely recognized by
Judge Godbold, specially concurring in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.:
An additional risk is that of collusive suit at the indirect and undisclosed behest
of the employer, giving him the possibility of a whitewash of systemwide em-
ployment practices by a judicial inquiry of narrow scope in a forum far distant
from numerous employees who may never have heard of the litigation, or, if they
have heard, not in such manner as to impel them to grasp hold of the problem
and make decisions about it.
417 F.2d at 1127.
135. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II);
accord, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); 2
LARSON § 49.52(d), at 10-93; Overview 332. The inquiry made on this point may be seen
as representing an overlap with the typicality requirement discussed earlier. See text
accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
136. Overview 332; see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1975);
1977]
33
Phifer: The Class Action Device in Title VII Civil Suits
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In its application, the representativity requirement has par-
ticular significance for the prospective class action plaintiff who
attempts to frame his action as an across the board attack against
a defendant's discriminatory employment practices. While in
many instances a court may gloss over this requirement in defer-
ence to the strong public policy favoring the elimination of dis-
criminatory employment practices,13 7 other courts are not apt to
be so neglectful of the absent class members' interest in having
adequate representation for their claims. 38 While an across the
board complaint may presumptively fulfill the requirements of
numerosity, commonality, and typicality, it should never be
viewed as presumptively satisfying the representativity require-
ment. The fact that a plaintiff's complaint attacks an underlying
policy of discrimination, thereby asserting an issue common to all
those aggrieved by discriminatory practices throughout a defen-
dant's operations, does not mean that he will have enough inter-
est or knowledge to litigate effectively all of the instances of un-
fair conduct subsumed in his cause of action. 139 Thus, before al-
lowing a plaintiff to prosecute or continue to prosecute an across
the board class action, the court should make certain that every
cognizable interest included within the alleged class will receive
the same type of representation which the plaintiff can be ex-
pected to give his own individual claims. Where it is doubtful
that this guarantee of the same quality of representation can or
will be made, the court should either restrict the definition of the
class, employ subclasses, or deny or revoke certification. In light
of the severe res judicata consequences that might otherwise re-
sult from inadequate representation, such actions by the courts
are necessary to ensure the absentees due process.
B. Maintaining Title VII Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)
Once the representative in a title VII class action has satis-
fied the four prerequisites of rule 23(a), he must then demonstrate
that his action fits within one of the subdivisions of rule 23(b).14°
accord, Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1113-14 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
137. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (5th
Cir. 1969).
138. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 1975); Free-
man v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1113-14 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Bradley v.
Southern Pac. Co., 51 F.R.D. 14, 15 (S.D. Texas 1970).
139. See Developments 1220-21.
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides the following:
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While this would seem to be an easy enough task to fulfill, its
significance should not be underestimated because the manner in
which the class representative's action is categorized will, in large
part, determine how he will have to conduct his action. In addi-
tion, the categorization of his action will be determinative of his
responsibilities toward the class and of the extent to which a
judgment entered in the action will be binding on the members
of the class. It is important, therefore, that the class representa-
tive be aware of which category of rule 23(b) likely will govern his
action and of what consequences that categorization will hold for
his role as the class representative.
A title VII class action generally will not be categorized under
subdivision (b)(1),'" which was designed to handle those situa-
tions in which the possible prosecution of multiple individual
actions would entail a risk of inconsistent adjudications, to the
prejudice of either the individual class members or the party
opposing the class."' Since the focus of a title VII civil action is
on compelling the defendant to conduct its employment practices
in a non-discriminatory manner, the risk of inconsistent adjudi-
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdi-
vision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the find-
ings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
141. See 2 LARSON § 49.53, at 10-96; Overview 334 n.55. But see Dennison v. Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 10 FEP Cases 1486 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
142. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. at
7765-66 (1970).
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cations seems minimal at best. Thus, the choice of which subdivi-
sion of rule 23(b) to apply in title VII class actions is traditionally
one between subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3). On the one hand,
subdivision (b)(2) is designed to deal with those class actions
which seek predominantly injunctive or declarative relief against
a defendant who has acted in a manner generally applicable to
the class as a whole. Subdivision (b)(3), on the other hand, is
designed to apply when common questions of law or fact are
predominant and the unifying effect of an injunctive action is
absent.
The question of which of these two remaining subdivisions
governs is resolved in relatively easy fashion when a title VII class
action seeks only class-wide injunctive relief from a defendant's
discriminatory employment practices. Since the focus in such an
action is on whether or not the defendant's employment practices
have general application to the class, subdivision (b)(2) clearly
governs.' Generally, it has been accepted that this subdivision
was drafted especially to govern those civil rights actions "where
a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a
class.""' If a title VII class action seeks exclusively or predomi-
nantly monetary damages," ." the determination of which cate-
gory will govern is likewise easily resolved. Subdivision (b)(3)
would clearly govern in such a case since the Advisory Committee
noted that subdivision (b)(2) was not intended to apply "to cases
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or pre-
dominantly to money damages."''
The choice is not so simple, however, when the class repre-
sentative frames his action with a prayer for class-wide back pay,
as well as for class-wide injunctive relief. In essence, the category
under which such an action will be placed is determined by the
manner in which the court characterizes the prayer for back pay.
Thus, if the court views an award of back pay as damages and as
143. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. at
7766 (1970); Bennett, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamping
of Class Action Strategy, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 801, 824.
144. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. at 7766
(1970).
144.1. A title VII class action will rarely, if ever, not seek exclusively or predomi-
nantly injunctive relief. Such actions will almost always seek some form of injunctive relief
since title VII class actions inherently seek to eradicate discriminatory employment prac-
tices.
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the primary focus of the plaintiff's class suit, then the action will
probably be categorized under subdivision (b)(3).14
The consequences of categorizing under subdivision (b)(3) a
title VII class action which seeks back pay relief and injunctive
relief are great. Unlike the other kinds of class actions authorized
by rule 23, a subdivision (b) (3) class action is subject to the notice
requirements of subdivision (c)(2).114 This distinguishing charac-
146. See Local 550, Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines,
Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); accord, Chrapliwy
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 7 FEP Cases 343, 345 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides that
[i]n any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
See Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class
Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1217, 1221 (1975). As evident from the
language of subdivision (c)(2), subdivision (b)(2) class actions are not subject to manda-
tory notice requirements. A judgment issued in a subdivision (b)(2) class action is binding
on all members of the class, regardless of whether or not notice was given. The same
cannot be said of judgments issued in subdivision (b)(3) class actions. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(c)(3).
The reason for this distinction may be explained as follows:
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) . . . are useful and effective tools for the
final determination of broad disputes concerning alleged discrimination. The
classes involved are capable of exact definition, in the sense that any person
coming before the Court, or another Court in subsequent litigation, can with fair
ease be seen to be within or without the class for resjudicata purposes. But the
specific identity of every class member is usually impossible to determine. This
is one of the reasons notification may be dispensed with . . . . [Tihe issue of
the existence of a policy of discrimination is one that demands a mechanism for
final resolution in our society. To require actual notification of all parties would
tend to defeat this. To allow class members to opt out would defeat it entirely.
The existence of a policy of discrimination is a group question which must have
a mechanism for resolution with group wide finality. This was the raison d'etre
for the creation of (b)(2) class actions, and no favor would be done to group
members to hamstring its effectiveness with notice requirements which are not
practically possible.
Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In a subdivision (b)(3)
class action, the focus is still primarily on the group or class but the interests of the
individual class members are also significant. Individual claims for relief may vary sub-
stantially, as may individual entitlement to relief, in this type of class action. Thus notice
is required to ensure that a class member will be provided the opportunities of acquiescing
to the class representative's representation, of appearing by counsel to litigate his own
claims, or of opting out of the litigation completely. In addition, this notice assures that,
where there is a favorable judgment issued to the class, the class members will have
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teristic carries with it two consequences of the utmost importance
to a (b) (3) class and its representative. First, the class representa-
tive is required to give notice to the class absentees;' and, sec-
ond, a subdivision (b)(3) absentee is provided the opportunity to
"opt out" of the class prior to judgment and thereby insulate his
individual claim from any adverse judgment which may be en-
tered against the class.'
With the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, "I the notice requirements of subdivision (c) (2) took on
added significance for the subdivision (b)(3) class representative.
The Eisen Court held that the class representative in a subdivi-
sion (b)(3) action is required to bear the full cost of individual
notice to all absentees identifiable through reasonable efforts.' 5'
In reaching this holding, the Court refused to allow this burden
to be tailored to fit the class representative's individual financial
circumstances'52 or to allow the burden to be shifted in full or in
part to the defendant in those instances where a preliminary
inquiry into the merits indicated that the plaintiff would be likely
to prevail on his claims.' 53
The hardship which the mandates set forth in Eisen would
work on a title VII class action representative is obvious. The fact
that a title VII class representative rarely has sufficient means to
afford the costs of class-wide notice,' 54 particularly in those ac-
tions which are brought as an across the board attack on the
discriminatory practices throughout an employer's enterprise,
tends to discourage class actions. The courts, however, have en-
sufficient notice to come forward and establish their entitlement to take part in the award.
See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. at 7767 (1970).
148. See note 147 supra.
149. See id.; Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Require-
ments in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217, 1221 (1975);
Overview 335.
150. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
151. Id. at 177.
152. Id. at 176.
153. Id. at 177-79. For a discussion of the impact that Eisen has had on subdivision
(b) (3) class actions in general, see Bennett, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court
Calls for Revamping of Class Action Strategy, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 801.
154. See generally Bennett, supra note 153, at 810. It has been suggested that it may
be possible to collect the costs of notice in subdivision (b) (3) class actions from the
defendant once the plaintiff succeeds on the merits. See id. at 814. Upon the happening
of that event, the plaintiff could assert that the expense of notifying the absent class
members should be obtainable as court costs supplementing the judgment. Id. However,
the cost must still be borne by the class representative in the first instance. See text
accompanying note 151 supra; accord, Bennett, supra note 153, at 814.
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couraged class actions as an effective means of eradicating broad
scale discrimination '55 and have similarly made back pay and
other affirmative awards freely available to discriminatees in
order that they might be made whole.156 To the extent the notice
requirements make it impracticable for a title VII plaintiff to
assert his action as a class suit for back pay, they present a very
fundamental conflict with these remedial policies.
Recognizing this threat to the continued viability of class
actions as a means of achieving the broad remedial goals of the
title, the courts have frequently avoided imposing the stringent
requirements of subdivision (c)(2) on title VII class actions by
opting instead for subdivision (b)(2) treatment. ' 7 This approach
usually has been justified by a two-step analysis. First, the court
notes that subdivision (b)(2) usually controls antidiscrimination
class actions. ' The court then seeks to resolve the problems
posed by an action which interjects a claim for class-wide back
pay in the request for injunctive relief contemplated by the tradi-
tional (b) (2) action. In this regard, the court generally notes that
the primary thrust of any title VII action is to eliminate the
discriminatory employment practices of a particular defendant,"9
a purpose which traditionally requires (b) (2) treatment. Pursuant
to this characterization of the statutory civil action, back pay is
155. For a discussion of the judicial engraftment of class actions onto the title VII
enforcement procedures to accomodate these policies, see text accompanying notes 25 &
26 supra.
156. This is done pursuant to the strong expression of congressional intent that make
whole relief be available to the victims of unlawful employment practices. See note 85 and
accompanying text supra.
157. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53 (3rd Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257
(5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v.
National Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Taylor v. Vocational
Rehabilitation Center, 13 FEP Cases 453, 457-58 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Overview 336.
158. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976). See
also text accompanying note 144 supra.
159. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3rd Cir. 1975),
vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Overview 336. In this context, one should
note that if the defendant corrects the challenged practice or practices on his own prior
to litigation, the claim for injuctive relief will be rendered moot. This, in turn, gives rise
to the argument that injunctive relief no longer predominates and that (b)(3) status is now
more appropriate than (b)(2) status. See Baham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 55
F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1973). Contra, Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 446 F.2d
763, 767-68 (8th Cir. 1971); Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v.
National Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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then read as an "integral part of the statutory equitable rem-
edy."' 6 Thus defined, the action is viewed as one requesting make
whole relief ancillary to the granting of injunctive relief from
discriminatory employment practices.'6 ' This assessment serves
to refute the contention that the action is one seeking exclusively
or predominantly monetary damages and permits the action to be
viewed as controlled by subdivision (b)(2). With the action thus
governed by (b) (2) requirements, it is no longer necessary that the
plaintiff satisfy the notice requirements of subdivision (c)(2).
The above analysis poses some very serious due process prob-
lems. As an initial matter, one should note that subdivision (b) (2)
treatment means that absent class members will have no oppor-
tunity to opt out and thereby to insulate their individual claims
from an adverse judgment entered against the class. 62 Yet, simul-
taneously, the absence of notice requirements for (b) (2) class ac-
tions means that even though an absentee will be bound by any
judgment entered in the action, he may well be precluded from
partaking in a favorable judgment simply because he is never
informed of its existence before the running of the statutory time
limit. No more astute assessment has been made of the problem
than the following:
[B]ack pay relief is predicated on a showing of individual enti-
tlement and thus requires that each class member come forward
and assert his own claim. Accordingly, Rule 23(b) (2) procedures
are not appropriate in a title VII class action in which back pay
relief is sought, for due process considerations mandate that
notice be sent to affected class members so as to provide them
an opportunity to supply all information requisite to their indi-
160. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)
(characterizing back pay award in this manner for purposes of determining whether or not
a jury trial was required); accord, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (applying this characterization of a back pay
award to the determination of whether or not back pay can be sought through a (b)(2)
action).
161. Edwards, The Bach Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems in
Procedure, 8 GA. L. REV. 781, 791 (1974).
162. Subdivision (c)(3) contemplates that a judgment in a subdivision (b)(2) action
will, win or lose, bind all those determined to be members of the class by the court. This
should be compared with the last portion of subdivision (c)(3) which limits the binding
character of a subdivision (b)(3) judgment to those members to whom notice was provided
under subdivision (c)(2) and who did not opt out. FaD. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(3); see Case Note,
Class Wide Awards of Back Pay in Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
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vidual recoveries. Indeed, it would be patently violative of fair-
ness and justice to expect a class member to come forward and
assert his claim or to permit his failure to do so to bar a claim
in a suit subsequent to a class action judgment or settlement
unless he receives some sort of notice.
163
This lack of notice to the absent class members also poses a
particular problem to the party opposing the class. Where no
notice is forthcoming to the absent class members, the defendant
must be prepared to face frequent relitigation since it is quite
probable that any judgment initially entered will be subjected to
constant collateral attacks from those claiming to have been de-
nied due process by the lack of notice. '64 This seems diametrically
opposed to the belief that class actions are desirable under title
VII as a means of resolving common grievances in one lawsuit.
At this juncture, it appears that title VII class actions seek-
ing back pay and injunctive relief simply are not amenable to
precise categorization under rule 23(b) without difficult problems
arising. In order to avoid these problems, two alternatives which
inject flexibility into title VII class action procedure have been
pursued. Both of these alternatives are designed to ensure that
absent class members are at least notified of the action so that
they may come forward and establish their entitlement to back
pay, if and when a judgment is entered favorable to the class.
However, as remains to be seen, neither alternative is a com-
pletely satisfactory solution.
The first alternative provides that the court will continue to
view the action as a subdivision (b) (2) class action but will exer-
cise its discretionary powers under subdivision (d) (2)' " of rule 23
to require the issuance of notice to absent class members.'66 The
163. Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class Actions: Problems of
Procedure, 8 GA. L. REv. 781, 797 (1974).
164. Id.; Overview 337; cf. Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 533
(W.D. La. 1976) (a judgment issued in an action which did not protect the due process
rights of the absent class members does not secure the party adverse to the class from
further litigation by the absent class members).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (d)(2) provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make
appropriate orders. . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in
the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action.
166. See, e.g., Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National
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type of notice required under this procedure appears to be within
the court's discretion. Thus, if the court believes that notice by
publication will sufficiently apprise absent class members of the
proceeding or, in any event, that notice by publication is the most
feasible notice, the court may limit its order accordingly. 17 By the
same token, if the court feels that the situation is one that de-
mands individual notice (i.e., where the class is relatively small
and its members readily identifiable, or where individual notice
alone will ensure that absent class members are actually noti-
fied), the court is free to require individual notice." 8 Moreover,
subdivision (d) (2) makes it clear that the content of discretionary
notice is for the court to decide.'69
While this alternative appears attractive, it is deficient in
two respects. First, by categorizing a title VII class action seeking
back pay and injunctive relief under subdivision (b)(2), this ap-
proach will preclude absent class members from opting out of the
class.' Thus, even though the problems caused by lack of notice
are taken care of by ordering subdivision (d)(2) notice, absent
class members will still be unable to insulate their individual
claims from a potentially adverse judgment."'
Second, the type of notice which the court chooses to require
can raise very significant problems. Should the court elect to
permit notice by publication, its decision will probably assure, at
least in large-scale across the board class actions, that actual
notice will not be given. The inadequacy of notice by publication
has been cogently noted before,' and it is doubtful that the
Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Va. 1975).
167. See Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415,417-18 (D.S.C.
1974).
168. See, e.g., Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National
Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Va. 1975); Thomas v. MicrolabIFXR, Inc., 11 FEP Cases 1167,
1169 (D.N.J. 1975); Kolta v. Tuck Indus., Inc., 11 FEP Cases 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(class action under 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970)).
169. See note 165 supra.
170. For a discussion of the problems which arise when title VII class actions seeking
injunctive relief and back pay are categorized under subdivision (b)(2), see text accompa-
nying notes 162.64 supra.
171. Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Va.. 1975).
172. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the
Supreme Court noted the following about notice by publication:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a reliable means
of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court
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issuance of such notice will be sufficient to resolve due process
problems.7 3 The problems are no less difficult, however, where
the court commands individual notice. If individual notice is or-
dered, the court must decide who will pay the initial costs.
Should the court choose to read Eisen as controlling in this con-
text as well as in the subdivision (c)(2) context, the initial costs
of notice will be imposed on the class representative. 4 But this
approach resurrects the policy justifications invoked against cate-
gorizing these actions under subdivision (b)(3). Alternatively,
to impose the costs on the defendant prior to a determination on
the merits will conflict squarely with Eisen.7' While it might be
argued that Eisen was concerned with subdivision (c)(2) notice
rather than subdivision (d)(2) notice, such a distinction is not
only risky, but tenuous as well. The Court in Eisen expressly
stated, without any reference to subdivision (c)(2) in particular,
that "[i]n the absence of any support under rule 23, [the cost
of notice may not be imposed on the party adverse to the class
prior to a determination on the merits]. The usual rule is that a
plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class."'7
A court choosing to rely on the ordering of subdivision (d) (2)
notice to ensure that due process is accorded absent class mem-
bers is thus confronted with some very difficult choices that do
not appear likely to result in a satisfactory solution. Accordingly,
on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded
on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings
to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted
in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of
the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information will never
reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when
...the notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed
to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In
weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are
unable to regard this as more than a feint.
173. As the Court stated in Mullane, "when notice is a person's due, process which
is merely a gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315;
accord, Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
174. See Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broad-
casting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Martinez v. Bechtel Corp., 11 FEP Cases
898, 905 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Kolta v. Tuck Indus., Inc., 11 FEP Cases 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (class action under 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1970)).
175. See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra.
176. 417 U.S. at 178-79.
177. Id. at 178 (emphasis added); accord, Martinez v. Bechtel Corp., 11 FEP Cases
898, 905 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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attention must be given to the second alternative available to
determine if it provides a more satisfactory solution.
The second alternative proposed envisions a bifurcated ap-
proach: notice issues to the absentees after a determination of the
defendant's liability has been made on the merits. " ' Under this
approach, the initial stage of the action is conducted pursuant to
subdivision (b) (2) because the sole issue at that point is the legal-
ity of the defendant's conduct toward the class."', Accordingly, no
notice is required, and all members of the class will be bound by
the ultimate determination made. If the court determines that
the defendant, by its employment practices, unlawfully discrimi-
nated against the class, the action will then convert into a subdi-
vision (b)(3) proceeding for the purposes of determining the de-
fendant's monetary liability for back pay to the class.180 At this
point in time, notice will issue to the absent class members,'8 '
arguably at the defendant's expense, since Eisen prohibited only
a shifting of the costs prior to a determination of liability on the
merits.8 2
While this bifurcated approach appears to be the better of
the two alternatives, it is not without shortcomings of its own. A
minor difficulty is that it fails to provide the defendant with a
chance to assess his potential liability at an early stage in'the
proceedings.' 3 More significantly, by deeming the initial stage of
the action to be controlled by subdivision (b)(2), this alternative
still fails to provide absentees an opportunity to opt out before
their peculiarly individual claims are cut off by a binding judg-
ment.8 Nevertheless, it may be argued that the inability of ab-
178. For an extensive discussion of the effect this bifurcated approach has on the
issuance of notice in a title VII class action, see Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title
VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. Rav. 781, 799-803 (1974).
179. See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 11 FEP Cases 424 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (order
granting plaintiff's motion for separate trials on issues of liability and individual entitle-
ment to back pay); Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 697-700 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(holding that class action first must resolve issues of liability under subdivision (b)(2)
before issues of entitlement to damages may be presented).
180. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 11 FEP Cases 425 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (order grant-
ing plaintiff's motion for separate trials on issues of liability and entitlement to damages);
see Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 1974); Paddison v.
Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 697-700 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
181, This would be required by FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c)(2).
182. Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title WI Class Actions: Problems of
Procedure, 8 GA. L. Rv. 781, 800 (1974); see Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 FEP
Cases 406, 410 (W.D. Ky. 1974). See generally note 154 supra.
183. Overview 338 n.76.
184. See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
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sent class members to opt out will exist anyway, insofar as the
back pay remedy is seen as incidental to the predominant, equita-
ble injunctive remedy constituting the basis of the action and
rendering it subject to subdivision (b)(2) treatment. This bifur-
cated approach, therefore, is the preferred alternative since it not
only ensures that notice will be forthcoming to the absentees, but
also structures the action in such a manner that when notice
becomes mandatory, the costs may be shifted to the defendant
who has already been found liable on the merits.
C. Commentary
Rule 23 normally has been construed very liberally in title
VII class actions. Most courts have felt that since class actions
are the most efficient means of attacking widespread employment
discrimination, procedural requirements should not be allowed to
inhibit unreasonably the availability of the class action device to
title VII plaintiffs. Thus, title VII class representatives usually
have established the propriety of their class actions under rule 23
with relative ease.
Nevertheless, rule 23 continues to play a significant role in
setting the course title VII class actions will be allowed to take.
This is particularly true in the context of ensuring that such
actions are conducted in a manner procedurally fair to the absent
class members. Thus, while a title VII class representative easily
may be able to establish, pursuant to rules 23(a)(1) and (a)(2),
that his suit is a proper one for class action treatment, he will not
always find it so easy to convince the court, pursuant to rules
23(a)(3) and (a)(4), that he is the proper person to represent the
class. Similarly, even though the class representative's action is
categorized under rule 23(b)(2), he may still be required to give
notice to the absent class members if his complaint seeks make
whole relief on behalf of the class.
It is important for the courts in title VII class actions to read
strictly those provisions of rule 23 which demand procedural fair-
ness to the absent class members. This should be done even
though a strict reading of those provisions will at times appear
to conflict with that policy favoring the use of class actions to
attack widespread discrimination. Where no compromise or alter-
native exists to resolve such an apparent conflict, this may mean
that certification will have to be denied a prospective class action
plaintiff or that the scope of a prospective class action will have
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to be drastically reduced. Nevertheless, it is preferable to restrict
the number of persons who would be benefited by a favorable
judgment rather than to risk the wide-ranging detriment which
would accrue from the res judicata effect of an adverse judgment.
V. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 23 TO CIVIL Surrs BROUGHT BY THE
EEOC
The 1972 amendments to title VII included provisions which
authorized civil suits by the EEOC.8 5 The title now permits the
EEOC to file a civil action in federal district court after making
a finding of reasonable cause on a filed charge and unsuccessfully
seeking conciliation from the charged party.' 8 Although the
EEOC can file a civil suit only when it has an unconciliated
charge before it, that suit need not be limited to the grievances
of the charging party. Rather, the courts have stated that "when
the EEOC sues on its own behalf it is entitled to broad judicial
relief that encompasses discrimination against persons other than
the charging party, as long as all charges of discrimination are the
subject of investigation and conciliation prior to initiation of the
judicial action."'8 Thus, an EEOC civil action may at times re-
semble a title VII class action. The question accordingly arises as
to whether or not the EEOC, in conducting such a suit, will have
to comply with the requirements of rule 23.
To the present date, the courts have split on this question.
On the one hand, some courts have treated the suit not as one
brought to vindicate the rights of the class members, but rather
as one brought to enforce title VII proscriptions and thereby
vindicate the public interest. Courts viewing EEOC civil suits in
this manner have generally held that rule 23 is inapplicable even
though the action may seek back pay on behalf of aggrieved indi-
viduals.' 8 On the other hand, some courts have viewed EEOC
civil suits as being the same as any other civil suit under title VII.
Thus, where the EEOC's complaint attacks a defendant's em-
ployment policies for being discriminatory toward a class of per-
sons, these courts require that the EEOC comply with the man-
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H1 1972); notb 16 and accompanying text
supra.
186. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
187. EEOC v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575, 578 (E.D. Wash.
1976).
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dates of rule 23 in the same way a private class representative
must comply.89
In any event, the ability of the EEOC to bring such wide-
ranging civil suits poses an interesting alternative to persons de-
siring to attack employment policies which discriminate against
a class of persons. Rather than face the rigors of complying with
rule 23 requirements (and particularly the rigors of possibly hav-
ing to notify innumerable absent class members), the aggrieved
individual might consider requesting that the EEOC take charge
of the litigation.'90 The EEOC will likely have no difficulty in
meeting the requirements of rule 23191 if those requirements are
imposed upon it, and the probability is great that the EEOC will
be viewed as exempt from compliance with the rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the recognition by the courts that class action suits are
the most efficient means of attacking widespread discrimination,
the class action device has become entrenched in title VII prac-
tice. Yet, this marriage of the class action device to title VII civil
practice has not been without problems. Too often, the courts
have been willing to read class action procedural requirements
liberally in order to promote the use of class actions to enforce the
title. This has resulted in many class actions which were proce-
durally incorrect. While such transactions have had an adverse
impact on title VII practice in many different ways, three areas
in which the impact has been particularly noticeable deserve
mention. First, procedurally incorrect class actions have served
to prejudice absent class members, who are denied effective rep-
resentation and notice that the suit has been brought. Second,
procedurally incorrect class actions have had an adverse impact
on defendants, who are forced to expend great sums of money in
litigating procedural issues in an effort to limit the action to its
proper dimensions. Finally, procedurally incorrect class actions
have impaired judicial efficiency by requiring courts to expend
great amounts of time resolving procedural problems or by requir-
ing courts to struggle with unmanageable class actions.
159. See, e.g., Niedhart v. D.H. Holmes Co., 13 FEP Cases 449 (E.D. La. 1976).
190. However, since the EEOC is burdened by a continually heavy caseload, it is
probable that the Commission will have to be shown some justification for taking control
of the action other than a simple desire to avoid the difficulties of rule 23.
191. See generally note 30 supra.
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It is important, therefore, that more attention be given to
class action procedural requirements whenever a title VII plain-
tiff files a class action civil suit. The courts must recognize their
obligation to ensure that the absent class members have proper
representation at every phase of the suit and that the action is
manageable. Attorneys on both sides should avoid relying on con-
clusory pleadings and motions to justify or attack the action;
rather, pleadings and motions should be factual in nature. Both
sides should set forth facts which will enable the court to deter-
mine whether or not the class representative is properly invoking
the federal judicial power and whether or not the procedural re-
quirements of title VII and rule 23 have been met. This, of course,
does not mean that inquiries into the merits of the complaint
should be made. Even though it admittedly is impossible to seg-
regate completely facts pertinent to the merits from facts perti-
nent to procedural issues, inquiries into the merits are to be
avoided. But the parties should be sure, and the courts should
demand, that sufficient facts are before the court to allow it to
determine the propriety of a class action under the class repre-
sentative's direction. While the policies underlying title VII
should condition this determination to the extent those policies
are promoted by class actions, a court should not forget its re-
sponsibility to ensure procedurally fair lawsuits.
Robert S. Phifer
*Editor's Note-A recent ruling of the Supreme Court mandates that named plain-
tiffs in a title VII class action must strictly fulfill the requirements of rule 23(a); compli-
ance with these requirements will no longer be assumed. In East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4524 (May 31, 1977), the Court ruled that the
named plaintiffs were not proper class representatives under rule 23(a) (see § IV, A supra).
In overruling the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (see note 34 and accompa-
nying text supra), the Court held that plaintiffs did not "possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury" (45 U.S.L.W. at 4527) as did the class members; further, it noted
that plaintiffs' failure to move for class certification bore on the adequacy of representa-
tion of class members (see § IV, A, 4 supra).
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